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TO BE OR NOT TO BE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTION OF THE CALIFORNIA
ABORTION LAW
In People v. Belous, the California Supreme Court voided the
state's criminal abortion statute, repealed in 1967,2 which provided that:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any
woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine, drug,
or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other
means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the mis-
carriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to pre-
serve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the State
prison not less than two years nor more than five years.3
After a jury trial, the defendant, Dr. Leon Belous, a doctor of high
professional repute,4 was convicted of abortion under this statute and
conspiracy to commit abortion. Dr. Belous had referred a prosecution
witness, Cheryl, to a doctor from Mexico who was practicing in the
United States without a license, for an abortion which Dr. Belous re-
fused to perform himself. In his defense, the doctor testified that he
had acted "in response to [Cheryl's] pleadings," and with the belief
that she and her boyfriend "would, in fact, do anything to terminate
the pregancy which might involve butchery in Tijuana or self mutila-
tion . . .. The Doctor believed that if the young couple carried out
their threats, Cheryl's very life was in danger." '
The conviction of Dr. Belous was reversed when the California
Supreme Court concluded that the statute was not "susceptible of a
construction that does not violate legislative intent and that is suffi-
ciently certain to satisfy due process requirements without improperly
infringing on fundamental constitutional rights." ' In reaching this
conclusion, the court first examined the individual words of the statute
and decided that by themselves they had no clear meaning and thus
were vulnerable to the charge of unconstitutional vagueness. The
:171 Cal. 2d -, 458 P2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
2 Ch. 528, § 1, [1935] Cal. Stats. 1605, as amended, CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West
1955). When the Therapeutic Abortion Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-
54 (West Supp. 1968), was adopted in 1967, § 274 was amended to provide that
abortions were illegal unless performed in compliance with the Therapeutic Abor-
tion Act.
3 Ch. 528, § 1, [1935] Cal. Stats. 1605, as amended, CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West
1955).
4 Dr. Belous is a licensed doctor in California, on the staff of a Los Angeles
hospital, a fellow of several medical societies, and a Director of the California Com-
mittee on Therapeutic Abortion. 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P2d at 195, 80 Cal. Rptr. at
355.
5Id. at-, 458 P2d at 196, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
6 Id. at -, 458 P2d at 197, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
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court then rejected various meanings which were offered to make the
language sufficiently clear. It concluded that this finding was further
supported because the statute delegated to the doctor, an interested
party, the power to determine whether a woman has a right to an
abortion.
This response was well attuned to current liberalization of both
thought and practice regarding abortion law reform. Accordingly, the
decision brings the law into a more realistic relationship with pre-
dominant social mores and beliefs. However, this writer believes that
because of the court's reasoning in reaching this result, such action was
not a proper judicial role, and that even if it were, the California court
failed to provide sound reasoning to support its result.
I. UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS
In attempting to define the phrase "necessary to preserve
life," the California Supreme Court first examined the isolated words
of the statute, and concluded that no clear meaning of "necessary" and
"preserve" could be ascertained. 7  It is not surprising that a seriatim
examination of the words convinced the court that the phrase was
vague. Necessity is a relative concept and must refer to a particular
object to be meaningful. Nor can the word "preserve" be understood
out of context. In the abstract, such words are not just vague, they
are meaningless.' Taken in context, however, these words do have
meaning. The object of the necessity in this statute is "to preserve
life." The term is defined by its object-life. Accordingly, the statute
was intended to permit abortion only when the alternative was death.
The conclusion that this was the intended meaning is supported
by an examination of various historical writings. Although early
English law condemning abortion made no exception for the mother's
safety,9 the priority of the mother's life over the foetus's was not a
novel idea when California enacted its abortion statute in 1850.
Medical, legal, and ecclesiastical writings reveal an impressive history
of familiarity with the concept of preference for the mother's life."0
7 Id. at -, 458 P2d at 198, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
8 "'Abstraction was the Jacob's ladder by which the philosopher ascended to
certainty. The further he was from the facts, the nearer he thought himself to the
truth."' F. LANGE, 1 HISTORY OF MATRIALISM 75 (1887), cited in J. FRANx, LAw
AND THE MODERN MIND 64 (1963).
9 Cf. Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the
Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 419-
22 (1968).
10 The Talmud mentions abortion only once and declares that "If a woman is in
hard travail and her life cannot otherwise be saved, one cuts up the child within her
womb and extracts it member by member because her life comes before that of the
child." TALMUD, Tohoroth, Oholoth 7:6.
In fourth century Rome, Priscianus, a doctor and scholar, wrote:
No one has the right to prescribe any means for producing an abortion.
A physician should not burden himself with this sin. Only where the uterus is
diseased or where the mother is exposed for other reasons to danger through
pregnancy, is an abortion permissible . . . . Just as it is sometimes of advan-
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Further support is also provided by a comparison with the statutes of
other jurisdictions which have broadened the exception to permit
abortions necessary to preserve "health." " The broader statutes were
undoubtedly intended to prevent the harsh results caused by California's
requirement that life itself must be at stake.
The court recognized that if a sufficiently specific interpretation
of the words could be adopted, the statute could be saved,' but it re-
jected all the suggested meanings, including the construction that life
itself must be at stake. Nevertheless, it appeared to assume that this
interpretation would be sufficiently certain. 3 Judicial history war-
rants this assumption.
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, courts have
dealt with the "necessary to preserve" standard in abortion cases with
relative ease.' Only two related issues were ever seriously litigated:
tage to remove the dry twigs of a tree in order to save the whole tree or as
a heavily laden ship may find it necessary in a storm to throw overboard
some of its cargo in order to prevent a shipwreck.
F. TAUSSIG, ABORTION SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED 277 (1936). Taussig also cites
an eighteenth century physician who claimed that
where it is certainly known that a mature child cannot possible be delivered
in the ordinary way alive, would it not be consistent with reason and con-
science, for the preservation of the mother, as soon as it conveniently can be
done, by artificial modus to attempt to produce an abortion?
Id.
The French historian Le Foyer noted that thirteenth century French canonists
also contemplated voluntary abortion to save the mother's life. LE FoYv, ExPosf Du
DROIT P-NAL NORMAND AU XIII SIfCLE 74 n.3 (1931), cited in Davies, The Law
of Abortion and Necessity, 2 MOD. L. REv. 126, 137 n.47 (1938).
In 1844, the Report of the Massachusetts Criminal Law Commissioners on
Abortion stated that abortion in order to save the woman's life was legally justified.
H. STORER & F. HEARD, CRImiNAL ABORTION 187 n2 (1868) [hereinafter cited as
STORER]. Similarly, in Great Britain the Criminal Law Commissioners advised in
1846 that an "expedient" exception for saving the mother's life be added to the
British abortion law. GREAT BRITAIN MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND HOME OFFICE,
REPORT OF THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMISSION ON ABoRTiON 29 (1939).
A medical treatise of 1845 affirms that
[t]he medical man is clearly justified in resorting to any measures which
promises to preserve the life of mother and child when both are threatened;
and where one only can by any possibility be preserved, the female herself
may use her right of self-preservation, and choose whether her own life or
that of her child shall fall a sacrifice to the means recommended to be used.
W. Guy, PRINCIPLES OF FORENSIC MEDICINE 145 (1845) ; cf. J. WHARTON, THE LAWS
RELATING TO THE WOMEN OF ENGLAND 155 (1853).
The California statute was preceded by those of New York (1828), Maine (1840),
Ohio (1841), and Virginia (1848). D. GRANFELD, THE ABORTION DECISION 79 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as GRANFIELD].
11 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-201 (1967). This statute was declared uncon-
stitutionally vague in United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
The opinion deals primarily with the vagueness of "preservation of health."
' 2 See 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P2d at 198, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
13 Id. at -, 458 P2d at 198-200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358-60.
14 The following random sampling of abortion cases indicates the wide under-
standing and usage of the exception to preserve or save the mother's life: People v.
Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953); State v. Lee, 69 Conn. 186, 37 A. 75
(1897) ; State v. Quinn, 18 Del. 339, 45 A. 544 (1899) ; Beasley v. People, 89 Ill. 571
(1878); Willey v. State, 52 Ind. 246 (1875) ; State v. Leeper, 70 Iowa 748, 30 N.W.
501 (1886) ; Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675, 171 N.E.2d 850 (1961) ; State
v. Meek, 70 Mo. 355, 35 Am. R. 427 (1879) ; State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52, 51 Am.
1970]
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(1) whether the indictment for abortion sufficiently alleged the lack
of necessity to preserve the mother's life,' 5 and (2) whether the state
bore the burden of proving that the abortion was not necessary to pre-
serve the mother's life.' 6 The most widely accepted rule places the
burden on the state to negate necessity, 1 but evidence that the woman
is normal and in good health adequately refutes the claim that bearing
a child would threaten her life. Medical evidence alone could prove or
disprove necessity.' It was understood by courts, juries, and doctors
that suicide, a concomitant threat to life,' 9 extreme emotional distress,
or social or economic considerations - were not acceptable justifications
for the abortion. In fact, the medical profession itself originally defined
the exception so narrowly that only when deformity of the pelvis would
Dec. 248 (1849) ; State v. Beylea, 9 N.D. 353, 83 N.W. 1 (1900) ; Moody v. Ohio, 17
Ohio St. 110 (1866); State v. Buck, 200 Ore. 87, 262 P.2d 495 (1953); State v.
St. Angelo, 72 R.I. 412, 52 A.2d 513 (1947); State v. Wells, 35 Utah 400, 100
P. 681 (1909).
15 See, e.g., State v. Quinn, 18 Del. 399, 45 A. 544 (1899) ; State v. Leeper, 70
Iowa 748, 30 N.W. 501 (1886).
16See, e.g., People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P,2d 29 (1953); State v.
De Groat, 259 Mo. 364, 168 S.W. 702 (1914) ; Moody v. Ohio, 17 Ohio St. 110 (1866);
State v. St. Angelo, 72 R.I. 412, 52 A.2d 513 (1947).
"TSee, e.g., People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953); People v.
Schultz-Knighten, 277 Ill. 238, 115 N.E. 140 (1917) ; State v. De Groat, 259 Mo. 364,
168 S.W. 702 (1914) ; Moody v. Ohio, 17 Ohio St. 110 (1866) ; State v. St. Angelo,
72 R.I. 412, 52 A.2d 513 (1947). But see Williams v. United States, 138 F2d 81
(D.C. Cir. 1943).
18
The fact that an operation was not necessary to preserve life may be
shown by evidence that the woman was in good health before the operation,
and her testimony as to her physical condition is sufficient on this issue.
People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 257 P2d 29, 32 (1953).
The authorities are to the effect that when it is shown that the woman
was healthy and in a normal condition . . . the evidence is sufficient to raise
the inference and to find the fact that the production of the miscarriage was
not necessary to save the woman's life ....
State v. Wells, 35 Utah 400, 407, 100 P. 681, 686 (1909). See also State v. Dunkle-
barger, 206 Iowa 971, 976-77, 221 N.W. 592, 594 (1928) (evidence of blood poisoning,
discharge and inflammation indicated necessity) ; Wells v. Insurance Co., 191 Pa. 207,
212-13, 43 A. 126, 127 (1899) ; Murphy v. Board of Medical Examiners, 75 Cal. App.
161, 166-67, 170 P2d 510, 513 (1946) ; People v. Smitherman, 58 Cal. App. 121, 123,
135 P.2d 674, 675 (1943).
19 It is very manifest that the statute was not intended to apply to such a
case [of threatened suicide], but only to a case where the death of the mother
can reasonably be anticipated to result from natural causes unless the child
is destroyed.
Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 362, 48 N.W. 380, 382 (1891).
In this context it is interesting to note that "there is good evidence that the
suicide rate among the pregnant is considerably lower than among the general popu-
lation of non-pregnant women." Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United
States, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 53 (D. Smith ed. 1967). See also GRANFIEL 104-05.
20 Abortion is criminal even though "animated only by kindly motives" when it is
"not in fact necessary to save the life of the woman." State v. Belyea, 9 N.D. 353,
361, 83 N.W. 1, 3 (1900). A physician must not be influenced by the woman's adjura-
tions, economic considerations, or sympathy for the girl threatened with social ruin.
G. RIDDELL, ABORTION AND MATERNAL MORTALITY 22 (1931); cf. Williams v. United
States, 138 F,2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1943). See also F. WHARTON & M. STMLIE, 3 MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE, 54-59, 67-69 (4th ed. 1884).
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preclude natural delivery of a mature child was abortion permissible.2
Through the years the courts have not, however, restricted the standard
of necessity to this sole exception and have assimilated other medical
conditions into this category.
Doubtless, careful scrutiny of the abortion statutes is required
because of the substantial penalties which may be visited upon a doctor.
Nevertheless, the harshness of the penalties is not itself a reason to find
a statute unconstitutionally vague.22 The test remains whether the
statute has adequately circumscribed the prohibited behavior.23 The
fact that a consistent standard of medical evidence has been applied by
the courts for over a century to determine the legality of an abortion 
24
is strong evidence that in practice the terms do have administrable
meaning. 5 Although
there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to deter-
mine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation
falls, this is not sufficient justification to hold the language too
ambiguous to define a criminal offense2 6
The only appreciable degree of uncertainty in the statute results from
the variability in judgment among doctors.2 7 Each must decide in good
faith if abortion is necessary to preserve the life of the mother; if his
estimate is inconsistent with that of a jury, he may be convicted of
unlawful abortion. But the void-for-vagueness doctrine is not a jury
corrective. Since juries must appraise novel fact situations in relation
2 1 F. OGsToN, LECTURES ox MEDICAL JtURSPRUDENCE 193 (1878); F. WHARTON
& M. STILLt, supra note 20, at 7.
2 2 See Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 448 (1953).
23 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1956).
24 Today, all states permit abortion when necessary to save the mother's life.
GRANFIELD 81.
In State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 244 A.2d 499 (1968), the court held that the
phrase "lawful justification" in the New Jersey abortion statute was not vague if
restricted to the necessity to preserve the mother's life. Id. at 191, 244 A.2d at 504.
See also State v. Buck, 200 Ore. 87, 93, 262 P.2d 495, 497-98 (1953).
On the basis of judicial experience with the doctrine, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts has recently held that the term "unlawfully," as used in the state
abortion statute,
has been made sufficiently definite by decisions of this court. In our cases it
has been stated over the years that a physician may lawfully perform an
abortion if he acts in good faith and in an honest belief that it is necessary
for the preservation of the life or health of the woman.
Kudish v. Board of Registration, - Mass.-, - 248 N.E.2d 264, 266 (1969).
.- See, e.g., cases cited note 18 supra.
26United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1946). The Supreme Court has also
affirmed the principle that if a "general class of offenses can be made constitutionally
definite by a reasonable construction of the statute, this Court is under a duty to give
the statute that construction." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954).
2"The doctor's good faith belief that the abortion was necessary generally pro-
vides a defense. See, e.g., State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 979-80, 221 N.W. 592
(1928) ; Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 395, 53 N.E.2d 4 (1944). How-
ever, it is clear that his judgment must rely on medical factors.
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to a given legislative rubric, no defense is immune from ambiguity inso-
far as it is subject to their appraisal."
The conclusion that the statute, as interpreted by the California
courts, gives sufficient notice of the conduct it prohibits is also supported
by comparison with the class of homicide cases in which a defendant
pleads that his act was necessary to preserve the life of another." The
defense is available to the defendant who can show that a serious danger
to another's life was imminent, though not immediate, and highly
probable, though not certain.30 Here too, the jury must evaluate the
defendant's judgment, notwithstanding that it is often made under
circumstances of greater complexity 3 and stress than in an abortion case.
For instance, the abortionist has more time for reflection than does
the homicide defendant claiming the defense of necessity. The latter
must make an immediate decision whether to take the life of the attacker
in order to save the life of the victim, while the abortionist has days or
perhaps weeks to deliberate and seek advice on his decision. Moreover,
the homicide defendant may have before him a less clear set of priorities.
If both the attacker and the victim are related to him, his instincts of
attachment may be equivocal. Accordingly, he is put to the hard choice
of choosing between the lives of two independently existing persons both
of whom have substantial emotional claims on him. To the physician,
on the other hand, it is clear before parturition that the foetus has fewer
human attachments and dependents than has the mother. Thus he has
a more objective standard by which to measure the relative worth of
the lives of the mother and foetus, whether or not one believes that use
of such a standard is morally tolerable.
Society has accepted the concept of necessity in homicide cases
where the penalty and social stigma for an incorrect evaluation are
28 Cf. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1946).
29 CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West Supp. 1968), which is representative of state
statutes dealing with noncriminal homicide, provides that:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in either of the
following cases:
3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a wife or
husband, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant of such person when
there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to
do some great bodily injury, and imminent danger of such design being
accomplished ....
A concise discussion of common law sources discussing the defense of necessity is
found in Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) in which Lord
Coleridge rejected the defense.
30 See, e.g., People v. Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59, 153 P.2d 21 (1944) ; People v. Dawson,
88 Cal. App. 2d 85, 198 P.2d 338 (1948) ; People v. Toledo, 85 Cal. App. 2d 577, 193
P.2d 953 (1948). Thus, some degree of indefiniteness has been accepted in abortion
cases.
31 The opinion of Lord Coleridge in Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D.
273 (1884), is illustrative of the complexities inherent in this social judgment.
It is not needful to point out the awful danger of admitting the principle
which has been contended for. Who is to be the judge of this sort of neces-
sity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured?
Id. at 287.
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greater than in the abortion cases. To accept the concept in the more
difficult homicide cases but not in the easier abortion cases seems
inconsistent.
The court declined to accept the interpretation that an abortion is
permissible only when the alternative is death, first on the ground that
it had been "rejected by the courts of this state as not reflecting legis-
lative intent .... ," 32 To establish this point, the court cited two
lower court decisions. However, in one of these cases, People v.
Arbanel, the court of appeals held that there was "a complete lack of
proof of criminal intent," 33 not, as the Belous court claimed, that the
mere possibility of suicide shows adequate necessity.3 4 People v.
Ballard,5 the second case cited, is also rather weak support for the
court's assertion. In Ballard, it was held that the evidence of the
woman's condition did "not seem to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
and to a moral certainty that she was in good health and that treatment
of some sort was not necessary." 3 Thus, the court concluded that
the prosecution had offered no testimony to refute the doctor's assertion
that the abortion was necessary within the meaning of the statute.3
The effect of the decision is merely to put the burden of proof upon
the prosecution to establish lack of necessity once the defense is raised.
But in any case, these decisions are not binding authorities vis-A-
vis the California Supreme Court. The court has, in effect, stated that
its decision to invalidate the statute for vagueness was compelled by
decisions of inferior tribunals within its jurisdiction. If the court in-
tended to save the statute, opinions of the lower courts, however inter-
preted, should be no bar. While it may be appropriate to inquire into
what the lower courts have said, the significant issue is whether they
were correct.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO LIFE AND TO BEAR CHILDREN
A second reason offered by the Belous court for rejecting the
"certainty" interpretation is that the high degree of necessity required
3271 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P2d at 198-99, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
3239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 35, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336, 339 (1965). The court held that
a doctor's reliance upon the recommendations of psychiatrists that abortion was
necessary to save the patient from the possibility of suicide was not consistent with a
finding of criminal intent. Id. at 33, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 338. Since the state had failed
to prove that the abortion was not performed to save the mother's life, the conviction
was vacated.
A reading of the complete record persuades [us] that under the authority of
People v. Ballard [167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P2d 204 (1959)] this judgment
must be reversed, as it almost demonstrably appears that the jury found
appellant guilty because they believed him to be a bad man rather than
because he had committed an illegal abortion within the meaning of the law.
Id. at 35, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
-4 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P2d at 204, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
35 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P2d 204 (1959).
36 Id. at 814, 335 P2d at 211.
37 Id. at 814, 335 P2d at 212.
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"would work an invalid abridgement of the woman's constitutional
rights . . . . " 38 The rights to which the court refers are her right to
life and her right to choose whether to bear children.
A. The Right to Life
The argument that the statute violates a woman's right to life is
not persuasive; protection of the woman's life is, of course, the sole
exception to the statutory prohibition of all abortions. Nor must the
doctor wait until the woman is on the verge of death before he can act;
the threat to life which is a condition to a legal abortion can be one
which is "delayed to a greater or less extent." " A woman's right to
life does receive protection from the dangers of childbearing.4"
The court apparently recognized that the certainty standard would
provide some protection of the woman's right to life, but it went on
to state:
We are also satisfied that the state may not require that degree
of risk involved in respondent's definition, which would pro-
hibit an abortion, where death from childbirth although not
medically certain, would be substantially certain or more likely
than not.4
However, this conclusion is not convincing.
Initially, it should be noted that the court recognized the possi-
bility that the statute could be construed as requiring a "more probable
than not" standard. Indeed, it was apparently the court's opinion that
that was probably the original intention of the legislature.4 However,
such an interpretation was rejected because the court thought that it
was not reasonably suggested by the words themselves, nor had men of
"uncommon intelligence" guessed at that meaning.' After the court
has stated that the relative safety test would be sufficiently certain to
save it from constitutional attack,' it is unclear why it is relevant
that men of uncommon intelligence have not guessed at that meaning.
Presumably, if that is the intended meaning and it is constitutional, it
ought to be adopted. Moreover, the argument that the words do not
suggest such a test seems strained. There does not appear to be any
reason why a "more probable than not" standard could not be read into
38 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
39 People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 814, 335 P2d 204, 212 (1959).
40 In making the argument that the statute abridged the woman's "right to life,"
the Belous court was apparently influenced by the statistics regarding the incidence and
effect of criminal abortions. See 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P,2d at 201 nn.9, 10, 80 Cal.
Rptr. at 361 nn.9, 10.
41 Id. at -, 458 P.2d at 203, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
4 2
1d. at -, 458 P.2d at 204, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 364. Specifically, the test would
weigh the probability of death by abortion against the probability of death in childbirth.
4-3 Id. at-, 458 P.2d at 205, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
44 1d. at-, 458 P,2d at 204, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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the words; had the court not been bothered by other aspects of the
statute it might have done so.
More importantly, however, the court in rejecting the "certainty"
standard overturned the balance struck by the legislature between the
competing rights of the mother and foetus. The court seemed to deny
that the legislature, in passing the abortion statute, intended to draw a
line for the protection of human life. If, as this Comment will seek
to show, that conclusion is wrong, the court's decision to upset the
legislative resolution is improper.
B. The Right to Bear Children
The existence of a "right to decide whether to bear children" is
open to question. The California court derived it from "the right to
'privacy' or 'liberty' in matters related to marriage, family and sex." '
As authority, the court merely cited cases, without elaboration or ex-
planation, which deduced a right to privacy from the fourth amendment
prohibition of unreasonable searches,46 the equal protection clause,47
and first amendment rights."' But these cases contain no more than
dicta to support a right to bear children, much less a right to abortion.
Moreover, while a right to privacy may be good constitutional law,
the circumstances which no doubt prompted its derivation from the ex-
plicit words of the Constitution do not exist in the context of abortion
laws. There is no "search of the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms"
involved in discovering a violation of the abortion statute,49 no arbitrary
discrimination among people, 50 nor any invasion of freedom of speech
45 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60.
46See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942). In Loving, although the Court raised a due process issue in the final para-
graph of the opinion, the decision was essentialy placed on the grounds of equal
protection:
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive
of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.
388 U.S. at 12.
4s Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
49 Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6o It has been argued by some proponents of abortion law reform that the present
abortion laws do discriminate against the poor. Referring to the hospital committee
system of approving abortions, one author has commented that the
most disastrous result . . . has been the economic and social discrimination
against one group-the ward patients. In large cities the poor, particularly
Negroes and Porto Ricans, are virtually denied the same medical care as the
privileged few . . . In a survey of 60 leading hospitals across the country, the
rate of abortions for private patients proved to be almost four times greater
than for ward patients . . ..
L. LADER, ABORTION 29 (1966). Nevertheless, Lader admits that it is the fear of
"religious and political pressure"--not the law-which has produced the inequities of
the committee and quota system. Id. 29. It is apparent that the methods of hospital
1970]
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or religion.5 ' Conceivably one could look to the ninth amendment
and classify it as a residual right, 2 but there is very little precedent to
support such a classification; nor does the California court make such
an argument.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the right of privacy or the ninth
amendment does provide a constitutional guarantee of the right to
bear children, as the Belous court recognized, the question whether the
abortion statute unconstitutionally interferes with this right remains
unanswered. In attempting to answer this question, the court reasoned
that (1) only a valid purpose will justify restriction of that right by
the state; (2) the purpose of the statute when enacted in the nineteenth
century was to protect the woman from the dangers of internal surgery;
(3) this purpose is now invalid because it is medically safer to abort
than to bear a child; and therefore (4) the statute has become uncon-
stitutional,53 since there is no longer any countervailing state interest.
Logical as this analysis may appear, its validity is compromised by the
assumption of an essential, but unwarranted, premise, and by what this
Comment asserts is the erroneous finding that the statute was not
intended to accord rights to the foetus.
The court's assumption was equation of the right not to bear a
child with the right to abort a foetus. Certainly, this equation is not
compelled. The right to an abortion is not essential to exercise effec-
tively the right not to have a child. One could conclude instead, for
example, that the right may be exercised only by some form of birth
control. Indeed, there is good reason to say that the question should
not be made, since a foetus is a living thing, albeit not an independent
one, that develops into a being to whom our society accords certain
rights. That the abortion statute intended to protect these rights and
to define the line for the protection of human life is crucial to the
criticism of the court's opinion.
administration and the availability of ward services are largely responsible for this
result. The equal protection argument was not raised in Belous.
See also ABORTION AND THE LAW, supra note 19, at 39-40, 89-90; R. Lucas,
Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State
Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 730, 769-73 (1968).
51 It has also been argued that abortion laws are sponsored by the Catholic
Church and therefore violate freedom of religion. See, e.g., ABORTION AND THE LAW,
supra note 19, at 231; LADER, supra note 50, at 165; Lucas, supra note 50, at 744.
However, it is clear that Catholics were not responsible for the original legislation,
for they were simply not a major political force at the time. Quay, Justifiable
Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEORGETOWN L.J. 395, 445 (1961).
Today, the statistics collected by A. Rossi suggest that Catholics are not alone in
resisting liberalization of abortion laws. A. Rossi, Public Views on Abortion, in
THE CASE FOR LEGALIZFD ABORTION Now 40 (A. F. Guttmacher ed. 1967). It seems
clear enough that abortion laws are the product of a Judaeo-Christian concept of life,
supported, perhaps, by biological evidence. LADER, supra 50, at 23, 94.
52 Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold v. Connecticut, relied on the ninth
amendment to protect "those liberties that are so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 381 U.S. at 487. The right to bear a
child might be included therein, emanating from the "'traditions and [collective]
conscience of our people."' Id. at 493 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1933)).
53 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P.2d at 200-02, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359-62.
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C. Protection of Human Life
It is a basic concept of "ordered liberty" that boundaries of an
individual's rights are drawn where they encounter the rights of
another.54 Thus, if rights are ascribed to a living foetus, the mother's
freedom to destroy it may be denied or curtailed. The issues which
the California court failed to meet are whether society may ascribe
rights to a foetus, and whether the California abortion statute did so.
More simply, does the existence of a living foetus limit the mother's
right not to bear a child?
These issues are further complicated by the impossibility of fram-
ing an answer in absolute terms. Rights may be gradually accorded
to, and withdrawn from, an individual at various stages of maturity;
the infant, for instance, is not treated as the equal of an adult. Fur-
thermore, although certain rights cannot be enjoyed by the child until
his birth, they accrue to him, in the sense that they can be enforced on
his behalf, before then. 5 In the eyes of the law "a child en ventre sa
mare is to be considered a living thing . . . ." 1 It is therefore no
answer to say, as the court did, that the law does not recognize the
foetus as "equivalent to a born child." "
At common law, the individual existence of the foetus was recog-
nized and protected juridically only after "quickening," 5' a moment
now deemed insignificant in foetal development by science and the law.
9
But this does not confute the principle that the state has a compelling
interest in protecting the life of any individual, and that it may choose
the point at which it will assert this interest. Societies which have
tolerated infanticide selected a point substantially after birth.
60 Those
54 Cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) ; Ex Parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763, 82 P. 429 (1905).
55 For an excellent discussion of the legal rights which accrue to the foetus before
birth, see Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law,
16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 233, 235-244 (1969) ; cf. Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge
on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554 (1962).
See also Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d. 629, 634, 92 P.2d 678, 681 (1939).
56 In Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255, 258 (1837), the court further
noted that the criminal law recognized the point of "quickening" as the beginning of
life, in contrast to the civil law. The abandonment of that notion in abortion statutes
has since eradicated the distinction between the concepts of life in the two fields.
57 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P.2d at 202, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
Furthermore, for at least some purposes, the foetus is treated like a born child.
A California court recently refused to dismiss an indictment for murdering a foetus
which was in the third trimester of pregnancy. Keeler v. Superior Court, - Cal.
App. 2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1969).
G8 "Life begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the
mother's womb." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129.
The word "foetus" is used in this Comment to mean human organism after con-
ception and before birth.
G9 The distinction was disavowed in the nineteenth century and has not been
retained by any state's abortion statute. F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw § 1220 (5th ed.
1861); J. REESE, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 441 (1884); and STORER, supra note 10,
at 1044, 1144.
60 Infanticide was practiced with indifference in Rome, for example, by exposure,
drowning, and strangulation. J. NOONAN, CONTRAcEPTION 85-87 (1965).
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which condone parricide withdraw protection after a point is passed."'
The choice made by the California legislature was to extend its pro-
tection to a foetus after conception. In a purely biological sense, this
was a rational judgment. In a social sense, it was a legislative evalua-
tion directly related to the objective of protecting human life.
The Belous court denied the relevance of the issue by treating the
statute as a device to protect a woman's health from dangerous abortive
techniques.62 In so doing, it misread the intellectual and legal history
of abortion legislation throughout the country. In fact, only one other
court has described the abortion statute as a measure primarily "to
guard the health and life of the mother against the consequences" of
the operation.' That statement is itself unconvincing when juxta-
posed with the observation in the same opinion that the offense of the
mother in submitting to abortion "is against the life of the child." "'
If the mother has offended against the life of the child by submitting
to abortion, it is difficult to understand why the abortionist has not.
Further doubt is cast upon the analysis of the Belous court by
comparing other judicial statements. In 1850, a Pennsylvania court
wrote that the essence of the offense is
the destruction of gestation, by wicked means and against
nature . . . . By the well-settled and established doctrine of
the common law, the civil rights of an infant en ventra sa nire
are fully protected at all periods after conception . . . .
This view was adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in 1909.66
Likewise, an earlier New Jersey decision held that the offense of
procuring abortion was, under common law, "an offence against life
[of the child]." The crucial issue in that case was considered to be
"whether the child be in esse, so that any crime can be committed
against its person." 11 Wisconsin expressed the same attitude by
requiring for the criminal offense the "intent . . . to destroy such
child." 68 Thus, judicial history indicates that the crime of abortion is
committed not merely against the health of the woman but against
the foetus after the stage of its development designated by law,
,0 P. FREUCHEN, BooK OF THE EsKIMOs 194-95 (1961).
6271 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P2d at 201-02, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61. It is interesting
to note that the court deals extensively with the dangers of surgery in the nineteenth
century which, it claims, justified abortion laws at that time. Id. However, a modem
authority states that "intra-uterine introduction of irritating substances to induce
abortion rather than surgery is the most frequenly used single method for inducing
criminal abortion." H. ROSEN, THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 8 (1964).
"State v. Murphy, 27 NJ.L. 112, 114 (1858), reaffirmed by the same court in
State v. Gredick, 43 NJ.L. 86, 89 (1881), and Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 52,
227 A2d 689, 705 (1967).
"4State v. Murphy, 27 NJ.L. 112, 114 (1858).
6Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 630, 632 (1850). "It is a crime against nature,
which obstructs the fountain of life, and therefore it is punished." Id. at 632.
06 Marmaduke v. People, 45 Colo. 357, 361-62, 101 P. 337, 338 (1909).
07 State v. Cooper, 22 NJ.L. 52, 54, 51 Am. Dec. 248, 249 (1849).
68 Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 360, 48 N.W. 380, 381 (1891).
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whether after the moment of "quickness," as provided under the com-
mon law, or after conception, as provided by statute.0
The medical profession agreed with this definition of abortion.
The American Medical Association in 1859 unanimously adopted a
resolution expressing their abhorrence of the practice of abortion "at
every period of gestation" as an "unwarrantable destruction of human
life," and added a prayer that the states strengthen their laws against
the crime.7" Doctor Horatio Storer and Mr. Franklin Heard ap-
provingly noted that this resolution "was sent to the legislatures of
the several States. There is reason to believe that, directly and in-
directly, it was productive of a great deal of good." 71
It is further apparent that legislatures enacting abortion statutes
were moved by a concern for the morals of society. "If sexual pleasures
could be indulged with impugnity," wrote one editorialist in 1832, "the
bonds which hold society together would be broken asunder." 72 Crim-
inal abortion, according to the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1858,
was "done with a wicked and base motive, offensive to good morals
and injurious to society .. . ." 7 These views comport well with
the fact that all of these statutes were enacted in an era permeated by
a highly moralistic temper.7 4 Nevertheless, though the articulation of
these moral attitudes may be outdated today, the decision to protect
life after conception cannot be dismissed as victorian prudery.
The California statute predated many of the foregoing comments,
but it was no less representative of the concerns prevalent at the time.
The penal code classified abortion as a crime "Against the Person and
Against Public Decency and Good Morals," rather than a crime
"Against the Public Health and Safety." 75 Individual doctors ex-
pressed repulsion for the mother's disregard of "life of the being within
her." "I "[T]he killing of a foetus at any time before birth is as much
murder as the killing of a child at any time after birth," another
medical scholar wrote."' Doctors displayed little or no concern for the
69 State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (1858). This court stated that the abortion
statute was enacted to protect the health and life of the mother, thereby filling the gap
in the common law.
70 STORER, supra note 10, at 135 n.1.
71 Id. 147 n.1.
72 Note, A Functional Study of Existing Abortion Laws, 35 COLUIm. L. RErv. 86,
93 n.39 (1935) (quoting 2 LEG. ExAm. 10 (1832)).
73 See L. LADER, supra note 50, at 89-92 (1966) ; cf. STORER, supra note 10, at 14,
60-64, 103, 134.
74 Commonwealth v. Wood, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 85, 89-90 (1858).
7 CAI. PENAL CODE tits. 9, 10 (West 1955). Title 9 includes crimes against
the person, public decency, and good morals; title 10 includes offenses against public
health and safety. Abortion, §§ 274-75, falls within title 9, along with rape, carnal
abuse of children, bigamy, incest, and indecent exposure.
76 3 F. WH ATON & M. STMIT, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 54-59, 67-69 (4th ed.
1884).
77H. CHAPMAN, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, INSANITY & TOXICOLOGY 173 (3d ed.
1903) (citing from an 1854 speech at the University of Pennsylvania entitled On
Criminal Abortion by H. Hodge).
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hazards of abortion to the health of the mother, but worried greatly
over her morals and the life of the child. Given that climate of opinion
at the time abortion statutes were enacted, it is not correct to conclude,
as did the Belous court, that "considerations of the woman's health"
were the primary motivations for the legislation."
Nor can it be maintained that a desire to protect the beginning of
human life is no longer a valid reason for upholding the constitution-
ality of abortion statutes. Modern courts also acknowledge a legis-
lative intent to protect the foetus. The Oregon Supreme Court held
in 1963 that the "main thrust" of their abortion statute was to prohibit
"acts done intentionally to cause the death of the unborn child." "
Likewise, Judge Thurman Arnold wrote in a District of Columbia case:
[I] t is apparent that abortion is generally regarded as heinous
in character. In the great majority of the states it cannot be
justified even to preserve the victim's health. Her life must
be in danger . . . . The performance of an abortion . . . is
so offensive to our moral conception that it does not seem un-
just to put on the defendant who has committed an abortion
the burden of producing evidence that the act was justified
on therapeutic grounds.8 "
No doubt social, moral, and philosophical judgments change. In
1968, for instance, the Therapeutic Abortion Act 8' passed in California
greatly expanded the priority of the mother's welfare. Such decisions
are bound to be controversial,8" since they involve basic decisions about
the protection of human life. But it is preferable that this kind of
judgment be made in a forum which can best reflect the feelings and
needs of the greatest number of persons in the society; judges should
respect a decision so made. As Justice Tom C. Clark pointed out:
It is for the legislature to determine the proper balance, i.e.,
that point between prevention of conception and viability of
the fetus which would give the State the compelling subordi-
78 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
79 State v. Elliott, 234 Ore. 522, 528, 383 P2d 382, 385 (1963).
80 Williams v. United States, 138 F2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
81 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-54 (West Supp. 1968). Abortion is
now permitted if "continuation of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or
mental health of the mother," if the pregnancy resulted from incest or rape, or if the
woman is under 15 years of age. Id. § 25951. It must be performed by a licensed
physician at an accredited hospital, after approval by a committee of the medical staff
of the hospital. Id.
82 See, e.g., N. MIETus, THE THERAPEUTIc ABORTION AcT-A STATEMENT IN
OPPOSITION (1967); THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABoRTIoN Now 35-49 (A. Guttmacher
ed. 1967) ; Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law,
16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 233 (1969).
For an indication that there is presently support for the view that human life
should still be protected after conception, see Greenhouse, Constitutional Question: Is
There a Right to Abortion? N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 30, 90-91.
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nating interest so that it may regulate or prohibit abortion
without violating the individual's constitutionally protected
rights.'
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION
A third rationale was finally appended to the Belous decision. The
court stated that the constitutional problems caused by the statute were
further aggravated because: "The delegation of decision-making power
to a directly involved individual violates the Fourteenth Amendment." 8 4
Although stated as a single issue, this problem is actually two-dimen-
sional. The first aspect focuses on the individual to whom the power is
delegated. According to this argument, a doctor has an interest in
depriving a woman of her right to an abortion because his erroneous
judgment could subject him to criminal prosecution and loss of his
medical license. Therefore it is a deprivation of the woman's liberty
without due process of law for him to decide the issue whether there is
a need for the abortion.
As authority for this theory, the court cites Tumey v. Ohio."
That case involved a mayor of a town whose responsibilities included
trying criminal cases, and whose fees were derived from the fines im-
posed on the defendants he convicted. The Supreme Court held that
this delegation violated the defendant's right to due process because the
judge had "a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching
a conclusion against him in his case." 6
Two considerations detract from the applicability of Tumey to Dr.
Belous's case. First, the doctor has a substantial countervailing incen-
tive. While fear of prosecution may inhibit his willingness to perform
an abortion, the immediate pecuniary interests, in combination with his
personal sympathies, might on the other hand weigh in favor of operat-
ing. Considering the fact that the possibility of criminal prosecution
and loss of practice is very rarely realized," there is no reason to be-
lieve that it would necessarily outweigh the possibility of pecuniary gain
combined with sound professional and human judgment.
Second, there is a distinction between the practical effect of the
decision made in Tumey and the decision of a doctor. One reason why
a decision by an interested judge is obnoxious to the due process clause
is probably that the defendant is bound thereby; this is not necessarily
83 Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2 LOYOLA
U.L.A.L. REv. 1, 11 (1969).
84 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P2d at 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
8273 U.S. 510 (1927).
86 Id. at 523.
s7 The lack of enforcement was noted in 1868, H. STORER & F. HEARD, CamNAN
ABoRTIoN 136-147 (1868), and has continued to the present, see L. LADER, ABORTIO N
70-73 (1966) ; Ziff, Recent Abortion Law Reforms (Or Much Ado About Nothing),
60 J. CRm. L.C. & P.S. 3, 8 (1969).
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true in the case of an abortion, for a woman can always continue to seek
out a doctor who will not be afraid to act on the strength of his medical
knowledge and judgment. Therefore, since the effect of the decision
made by the doctor is considerably less severe, one should not apply to
him the same due process standards developed for the behavior
of judges.
Further, the more fundamental aspect of the delegation problem,
which concerns the degree of power delegated, was unfortunately neither
clearly differentiated nor adequately discussed by the court. Develop-
ment of this issue raises further doubts about the court's conclusion.
The right to an abortion was not deemed absolute; the court recognized
that a valid state purpose could limit it." Accordingly, the issue should
have been the method by which the legislature chose to apply restric-
tions. The California authorities cited by the court agree that legis-
lative power may be delegated if there is "an ascertainable standard" "
for its application; in those cases the authority to regulate industrial
prices was delegated without a proper standard, which resulted in a
power so arbitrary that it violated due process. Thus the heart of the
matter is really vagueness. If the standard by which the doctor makes
his decision is indeed ascertainable, as the court appeared to admit and
as is contended above,"° delegation of that power is not unconstitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Belous court may have been seeking, perhaps justly and with
reason, to save the career of an eminent physician. However, if that
was the court's motive, the judicial method used was perhaps not ade-
quately tailored to it. It was surely not necessary to reach the consti-
tutional issue in order to acquit Dr. Belous. As the court itself indi-
cated,"' earlier decisions left room enough to find that the verdict was
contrary to the weight of the evidence of the doctor's intent.
Moreover, there was good reason to act with judicial restraint, for
the rationale of the Belous decision extends to more than just the statute
before the court at that time. Not only does it threaten similar statutes
which currently exist in thirty-seven states, 2 but it also raises doubts
about the constitutionality of the new Therapeutic Abortion Act"3 in
88 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
89 Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 235, 368 P2d 101,
104, 18 Cal. Rptr. 501, 504 (1962) ; State Bd. v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d
436, 448, 254 P.2d 29, 36 (1953).
90 Text accompanying notes 13-31 mipra.
9171 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P.2d at 198-99, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
92 For a state-by-state listing of current abortion statutes, Yee H. Ziff, Recent
Abortion Law Reforins (Or Mitch Ado About Nothing), 60 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 3,
3-4 (1969).
03 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-54 (West Supp. 1968). See note 81
sitpra. A lower California court recently found this act unconstitutional. People v.
Robb, No. 149005 (Cal. Orange County Mun. Ct., Jan. 9, 1970).
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California. That statute was not, of course, before the court, but it
appears that even its clarifying features will not save it if it is no longer
rationally related to an end which the state may properly seek to achieve.
If the court believes that medical safety no longer justifies restrictions
on hospital abortions during the first four months of pregnancy,94 and
that the abortion statute recognizes no right to life of the foetus, 5 then
on what grounds can a woman ever be restrained from exercising her
"right to an abortion"?
It is unclear how strongly the court relied on this purported "right
to an abortion." The void-for-vagueness rationale would be superfluous
if the statute were an invalid exercise of the police power. But the
court, perhaps reluctant to commit itself fully to either argument, care-
fully intertwined the two. Until the court further clarifies the extent
of the right to bear children, the future of abortion law in California
is uncertain.
Jane Lang McGrew
9 71 Cal. 2d at -, 458 P2d at 200-02, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360-62.
95 Id. at -, 458 P2d at 203, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
